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COMMENTS
U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software:
Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten
the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to
Compete in Foreign Markets
1. Introduction
For seventy-five years, the United States has considered crypto-
graphic technology' a threat to national security. 2 In response to this
threat, the United States has imposed severe export controls on data
encryption software. 3 According to the Department of Defense, en-
cryption software falls into the same classification as guns, bombs, and
missiles, and as such, its export to foreign countries is tightly con-
trolled. 4 In spite of these facts, encryption software is widely available
around the world.5 For example, in Russia, anyone can easily purchase
a copy of the encryption program Crypto II on the streets of Moscow
for five dollars.6 Many European companies are allowed to export en-
cryption software with very little, if any, restrictions imposed.7 Why
then does the United States believe that data encryption software is
such a threat to national security when so many other countries have
no restrictions at all?
This Comment examines the debate between the U.S. govern-
ment and the U.S. software industry regarding export controls on data
encryption software and the potential effect of encryption software on
the national security of the United States. This Comment first de-
scribes some of the threats to computer systems in general and then
defines the specific protection offered by encryption software. The ex-
port controls on computer software are examined along with the con-
trols imposed on encryption software.
1 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
2 Mitch Ratcliffe, Export Control Bill Could Bring Easing of Restrictions on Encryption
Software, MACWEEK, Dec. 10, 1991, at 95, 95.
3 See infra Part IV.
4 See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
6 John P. Barlow, Decrypting the Puzzle Palace, COMM. ACM, July 1992, at 25, 27.
7 Evelyn Richards, U.S. Plan to Restrict Encryption Software Exports Draws Protests, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 14, 1991, at Bl.
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Finally, this Comment focuses on the efforts by the executive and
legislative branches of the U.S. government to change these export
controls, the National Security Agency's 8 arguments for continuing ex-
port controls, and the software industry's arguments for removing ex-
port controls. This Comment concludes that mass-market encryption
software is not enough of a threat to the security of the United States
to justify current export controls and that mass-market encryption
software should be restricted only under the mechanisms currently es-
tablished for most software products.
II. What Is Encryption Software?
The increased use of computers in society has resulted in the com-
puter storage of everything from an individual's medical records to a
business' trade secrets. The world has come to rely on computers to
facilitate telephone calls, to regulate life support systems, and to moni-
tor nuclear reactors.9 As enormous amounts of information are com-
puterized, there is a need to protect the privacy and security of such
information from outside dangers. 10
A. Threats to Computer Systems
There are many threats to computer information. Computer data
is at risk when it is processed, stored, and transferred between com-
puters. 1 One of the greatest threats to computer security is a
"hacker." 12 Hackers are people known for breaking into computer sys-
tems and causing mischief and even damage to computer informa-
tion.13 What was once considered a childish prank by many is now a
matter of great concern to corporations, governments, and law en-
forcement agencies.1 4 Unauthorized access of computer systems gen-
erally occurs for one of three reasons: (1) an illegal attack for profit or
some other benefit; (2) a malicious attack for revenge; or (3) a par-
tially or totally nondestructive attack perpetrated as a game or
challenge.15
8 See infta notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
O TIME-LIFE BooKs, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS: COMPUTER SECURITY 8 (1986).
10 See generally PER CHRISTOFFERSSON ET AL., CRYPTO USERS' HANDBOOK (1988); MORRIE
GASSER, BUILDING A SECURE COMPUTER SYSTEM (1988); JEROME LOBEL, FOILING THE SYSTEM
BREAKERS (1986); TIME-LIFE BOOKS, supra note 9.
11 CHRISTOFFERSSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
12 TIME-LIFE BOOKs, supra note 9, at 8. The term "hacker" was created by Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) students to describe other students who worked late at night
in computer labs. Id. at 10.
13 Id A group in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, broke into more than 60 computer systems,
including a nuclear research facility and a cancer research center. Id. A Los Angeles high
school student broke into a state university computer system, and destroyed research data
'Just for the fun of it." Id. In Chicago, Illinois, a teenager broke into DePaul University's
computer system, causing a computer failure. He deleted part of the computer's operating
system. Id.
14 LOBEL, supra note 10, at 2.
15 Id at 13.
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Other threats to computer security include viruses, 16 Trojan hor-
ses, 17 logic bombs,' 8 worms, 19 " and trapdoors.20  Viruses can be
designed to damage computer resources, steal secret data and commu-
nicate it to another source, or seek out a specific computer in a com-
puter network to perform the two previous operations.21 These threats
are often designed by a type of hacker known as a "technical merce-
nary."2 2 Technical mercenaries have advanced computer knowledge
that they use to sabotage a computer system or to commit industrial
and foreign espionage.2 3 The mercenaries are frequently hired by pri-
vate intelligence organizations, international criminal organizations,
terrorists, and Third World governments to carry out their destructive
plans.24 In response to these threats, governments are now enacting
tougher laws with greater punishments for unauthorized access of
computer systems. 25 Unauthorized access has also caused greater in-
terest in computer security and access control.2 6
B. Security for Computer Systems
Computer security can take many forms. A computer system may
have access control software that utilizes user IDs and passwords, 27 it
may have operating system security that controls access to vital areas of
16 Peter E. Sakkas, Espionage and Sabotage in the Computer Worl, 5 INT'LJ. INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 155, 156 (1992). A virus is a "software program that can spread its
infection from computer to computer using each infected computer to replicate itself." Id.
The most dangerous virus is the Genetic-Based Virus.
A Genetic-Based Virus (GBV) is based on a Genetic Algorithm which results
from research in "artificial life." It derives its name from the mechanics of
natural selection via natural genetics. A GBV combines a survival of the fittest
among artificial creatures (String Structures) with a structured yet randomized
information exchange to form a more complex GBV. In each generation
(every time the GBV is activated) a new set of artificial creatures is created
combining the fittest of the old with an occasional part of the new. These
viruses have the ability to self-repair, self-guide, and self reproduce following
the same rules as those of biological systems. Each successive generation can
reproduce a GBV of increasing complexity. A GBV may have its own immune
system and techniques to evade capture. At the present known state of the art,
a GBV is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discover.
Id. at 158.
17 A Trojan horse is similar to a virus, but a Trojan horse cannot replicate itself and it
cannot spread. Id. at 157.
18 A logic bomb is a "[vi irus that activates itself either at a specified date and time or on
the occurrence of some specific event or set of events." Id. at 158.
19 A worm is a "piece of software that snakes its way through a single computer system
or a network of computer systems: manipulating, altering, or destroying data and/or pro-
gram code wherever it obtains access." Id
20 A trapdoor bypasses computer security controls to permit a "special access to the
computer operating system." I. at 159.
21 Id. at 156.
22 Id. at 165.
23 Id&
24 Id. at 167-69.
25 LOBEL, supra note 10, at 2.
26 ld.
27 Id. at 126.
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a computer's resources, 28 or it may have data encryption software that
scrambles information to make it unusable.2 9 These are just a few of
the many ways to protect computer information. This Comment fo-
cuses on the use of data encryption software as a form of computer
security.
Data encryption software is based on the ancient art of cryptogra-
phy. Cryptography is a "technique of concealing the content of a
message by a code or a cipher."3 0 The military has used cryptographic
techniques in software for decades;3 ' however it has always been too
expensive for use in the commercial world.32 All this has changed as
the price of cryptographic techniques has decreased and the need for
security in many commercial computer systems has increased.3 3
Data encryption software uses a mathematical algorithm that al-
lows anyone to translate computer data into a form that an unauthor-
ized user cannot interpret unless the user knows the method or "key"
used to encrypt the data.3 4 A key consists of a preset number of bits
containing a string of zeros and ones.3 5 An algorithm is presumed to
be more secure if the key has many bits.3 6 Encrypting computer data
protects the confidentiality of the information represented by the
data.3 7 Encryption software does not prevent access to the computer
data, but it prevents an unauthorized user from using the
information.3 8
There are two primary encryption systems used today: a single-key
system and a two-key system.39 In a single-key system, data is encrypted
and decrypted using the same key.40 The Data Encryption Standard
28 Id. at 138-39.
29 Id. at 193.
30 Id. at 194.
31 CHRISTOFFERSSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. As early as fifth century B.C., Greeks in
Sparta used ciphers for disguising official communications. TIME-LIFE BooKS, supra note 9, at
88. Julius Caesar used an encryption technique called substitution to protect confidential
messages. Id.
32 CHRISTOFFERSSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
33 Id.
34 Id at 1-2. Most data encryption software is also able to decrypt the encrypted com-
puter data to put that data back into its original form. Id. at 2. Decryption is simply the
opposite of encryption. It is synonymous with decoding.
35 The Impact on America's Software Industry of Current U.S. Government Munitions Export
Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings, Ozzie] (testi-
mony of Ray Ozzie, President, IRIS Associates) (on file with author).
36 Id Contra Bruce Schneier, The Cambridge Algorithms Workshop, DR. DOBB'S J., Apr.
1994, at 18, 22. To illustrate this presumption, if a key has two bits, there are four possible
key combinations: 00, 01, 10, and 11. If you add one bit to the key, there are now eight
possible key combinations. There is an exponential growth in key combinations with the
addition of each key. Therefore, if many bits are used, there will be many possible key combi-
nations, which increases the security of the algorithm.
37 CRInSTOFFERSSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
38 Id.
39 TIME-LIFE Booxs, supra note 9, at 92.
40 I&
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(DES) has become the standard single-key system used in the United
States.41 It was developed by scientists at International Business Ma-
chines (IBM) 42 and has a fifty-six bit key length, which gives seventy
quadrillion possible key combinations. 43 The DES divides a message
into blocks of eight characters and then scrambles each block using
the designated key.44 The DES is considered to be unbreakable. 45
In a two-key system, a pair of keys are used to encrypt and decrypt
data.46 The public-key system is a common two-key system where there
is a public key available to everyone, and there is a secret key known
only to its owner.4 7 A computer operator may use the public key or his
own personal secret key to encipher or decipher data.48 The most
common public-key system is the RSA49 system, which was developed in
1978.50 The RSA system uses two very large prime numbers to create
the public and secret keys.51 The two prime numbers are multiplied
together, creating a number that is approximately 200 digits long.52
41 The DES was adopted on January 15, 1977, as the official standard for protecting
unclassified computer data by the U.S. government. See 48 Fed. Reg. 41062 (1983). The DES
was reaffirmed on December 30, 1993, for another five years as the official Federal Informa-
tion Processing Standard. NATIONAL INSTrrUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP'T
OF COM., FED. INFO. PROCESSING STANDARDS PuB. 46-2, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) 1
(1993).
42 TIME-LIFE BOOKS, supra note 9, at 93.
43 Id,
44 Id.
45 James Daly, Security Pros, Clinton Clash over Encryption Standards, COMPUTERWORLD,Jan.
31, 1994, at 79, 79. However, in 1991 two Israeli scientists developed a way to break the DES
under certain limited circumstances. John Markoff, A Public Battle Over Secret Codes, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1992, at DI. While the DES algorithm itself is considered secure, the DES is
subject to a "brute-force" attack. TIME-LIFE BOOKS, supra note 9, at 92. In a brute-force at-
tack, all possible keys are tried in an effort to find the key used to encrypt a message. Id. In
1986, it was estimated that a fast computer would take 2283 years to try all possible keys.
LOBEL, supra note 10, at 198. However, advances in computer technology have decreased the
time necessary to succeed using a brute-force attack. Schneier, supra note 36, at 22. In 1994,
it is estimated that if $1 million were spent to build a computer to specifically break the DES,
it would take the computer 3.5 hours to try all possible keys. Id. If $1 billion were used, it
would take 13 seconds to try all of the DES keys. Id. There has even been a movie, "Sneak-
ers," about the invention of a fictional computer that was capable of breaking any encrypted
information in the world. SNEAKERS (Universal City Studios 1992). See Peter Hum, The Code
Breaker: A Local Researcher Has Found a Way to Decode the System That Keeps Your Personal Records
Safe, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 19, 1994, at BI; Max Schireson, Decoding the Complexities of Cryptog-
raphy, PC WK., Jan. 10, 1994, at 84, 84.
46 TIME-LIFE BOOKS, supra note 9, at 92. Each key may contain as many as 200 digits. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. The most common method is to use the public key to encrypt the data and the
secret key to decrypt the data. This allows anyone to send an encoded message, but only the
recipient can decode the message using his secret key. Id. at 112-13.
49 The RSA system was named after its inventors Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leo-
nard Adleman. Id. at 113. RSA Data Security Inc., in Redwood City, California holds the
patent to the RSA system. Joshua Quittner, Computer Code Will 'Hide' Users: But the Feds Want
Their Own Key, NEWSDAY, June 3, 1991, at 4, 4.
50 TIME-LIFE BOOKS, supra note 9, at 101.
51 Id.
52 Id
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The RSA system is used in many situations where computer networks
are involved.
Even though the threats to computer systems are numerous and
very dangerous,5 3 data encryption software offers a reliable way to pro-
tect information by scrambling the information, making it useless to
anyone who does not have the key to unlock the encryption al-
gorithm.54 While U.S. companies currently dominate software markets
around the world,5 5 the ability of U.S. software companies to compete
in foreign markets depends on their ability to export their products
overseas. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the export controls im-
posed on computer software in general before analyzing the specific
export controls which restrict the free flow of data encryption software.
III. Export Control of Computer Software
The United States established export controls in 1949 to prevent
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries from obtaining West-
ern technology that could enhance the military potential of those
countries. 56 The United States implemented these controls by enact-
ing the Export Administration Act 57 and the Export Administrative
Regulations. 5 8
A. COCOM and Its Role in the Control of U.S. Exports
As part of the effort to control exports, the United States also or-
ganized the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM). 5 9 COCOM comprises seventeen industrialized Western
nations60 with the purpose of coordinating "the export control policies
of the member nations with respect to the export of 'dual use' com-
modities, software and technical data to the Soviet Union, the other
Warsaw Pact countries and the People's Republic of China.16 1
COCOM identifies products that can enhance the military potential of
threatening countries and then registers these products on the
53 See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
55 See infta notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
56 John F. McKenzie, Implementation of the Core List of Export Controls: Computer and
Software Controls, 5 SovrwARE L.J. 1, 1 (1992).
57 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as
amended in 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
58 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-799 (1993).
59 McKenzie, supra note 56, at 1. The members of COCOM did not have much choice
because the Battle Act of 1951, 22 U.S.C. § 1613(d) (superseded 1979), stated that "no mili-
tary, economic, or financial assistance would be supplied to any nation unless it embargoed
shipments to any nation ... threatening the security of the United States." DAVID M. KEMME,
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS AND EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE 1990s 5 (1991).
60 The 17 member nations are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993).
61 McKenzie, supra note 56, at 1.
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COCOM Industrial List. 62 After the Industrial List is compiled, mem-
bers of COCOM incorporate the Industrial List into their own export
control programs. 63
After the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope in 1990, COCOM significantly relaxed its export controls.64 The
COCOM member nations rewrote the Industrial List and restricted
only those products having "truly significant military applications."65
COCOM completed a new "Core List" of products in May 1991.66 The
United States adopted the new list in August 199167 and refers to it as
the Commerce Control List (CCL). 68
B. The United States Implementation of the CCL
In the United States, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)
maintains the CCL. 69 The CCL is divided into ten general categories:
Materials, Materials Processing, Electronics, Computers, Telecommu-
nications and Cryptography, Sensors, Avionics and Navigation, Marine
Technology, Propulsion Systems and Transportation Equipment, and
Miscellaneous Items. 70 These categories are then further divided into
five groups: Equipment, Assemblies and Components; Production and
Test Equipment; Materials; Software; and Technology. 7' The
CCL is a comprehensive "list of all of the commodities, software and
technical data that are subject to export controls."72 The CCL tells
why controls are imposed 73 and to which countries the exporter
may be limited or prohibited from sending products. 74 The CCL
also indicates what type of license 75 an exporter must obtain to sell his
62 Id. at 1-2.
63 Id. at 2.
64 Id. It is also essential to encourage the flow of technology to achieve democratic and
economic reforms. Information Technology Trade Sets Off As COCOM Lifts Technology Export Re-
strictions, COMPUTING, Jan. 9, 1992 at 1, 1 [hereinafter Information]. COCOM officials for the
United States and its allies have recommended to their governments that COCOM be dis-
mantled and a new alliance be formed that may include Russia, China, and other Eastern
European countries. U.S., Allies Agree to Dismantle COCOM by April 1, 1994, and Set Up New
Regime, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1960, 1960 (Nov. 24, 1993).
65 McKenzie, supra note 56, at 2.
66 Id.
67 56 Fed. Reg. 42,824 (1991).
68 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. No. 1 (1993).
69 Id. § 799.1(a).
70 Id. § 799.1(b)(1).
71 Id. § 799.1(b) (2).
72 McKenzie, supra note 56, at 3.
73 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(d) (1) (iii) (1993). The CCL gives reasons for the export control
such as: national security, missile technology, nuclear proliferation, and chemical or biologi-
cal warfare. Id.
74 Id. § 799.1 (a) (4). For example, an exporter may be able to send a product to France
but not to Korea.
75 There are two primary types of export licenses: a validated license and a general
license. The validated license is "a document issued by or under the authority of the Bureau
of Export Administration, authorizing export." Id. § 770.2. An exporter must apply for a
validated license. Id. § 772.4.
1994]
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products overseas. 76
The CCL is much more complex than the export control lists used
in the past.77 Software subject to export controls used to be in one
category;78 however, software is now scattered throughout the CCL,
making it much more difficult to identify which software products are
subject to export controls.7 9 A software exporter must carefully check
the software group in each of the ten categories to see whether there
are any export restrictions on his particular software. 80 However, for
exporters of mass-market software, i.e., software that is generally avail-
able to the public,8 1 there is a special provision that grants a general
license,82 with a few restrictions, to these exporters. 83
While determining the correct classification to be used may be
burdensome to some software exporters, the majority of software ex-
porters will find the CCL very useful in finding out whether and to
what extent their software is controlled by export regulations. 84 For
exporters of mass-market software, the task is much easier. These ex-
porters are granted a general license and may export their software to
most countries around the world.8 5 A good general rule is that if a
product can be bought at a local computer store, it can probably be
exported out of the country. However, this is not the case for all mass-
market software. For some mass-market software, there are very strict
export controls. This is especially the case for mass-market software
that utilizes any form of encryption.8
6
[A general license is] a license established by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce for which no application is required and for which no document is
granted or issued. It is available for use by all persons, except those listed in
and prohibited by the provisions Of Supplement No. I to part 788, and permits
export within the provisions thereof as prescribed in the Export Administration
Regulations.
Id. § 770.2.
76 Id § 799.1(d)(1).
77 McKenzie, supra note 56, at 3. The nomenclature for classification purposes is en-
tirely different. This will cause exporters to have to figure out how their products are now
classified under the new system. Id.
78 David A. Wormser, Export License for Computer Software, in COPING wn'H U.S. EXPORT
CoNTRoLS (1985), at 411, 411 (PLI Computer Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
353, 1985).
79 McKenzie, supra note 56, at 3.
80 For example, software created to develop and test semiconductors may be classified
under Category 3D or 4D. Id. at 3-5.
81 To be considered "generally available to the public," the software must be "sold from
stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of: 1. Over the counter transac-
tions; 2. Mail order transactions; or 3. Telephone call transactions." 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp.
No. 2 (1993). The software must also be "designed for installation by the user without fur-
ther substantial support by the supplier." Id.
82 See supra note 75.
83 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. No. 2 (1993). The exact type of license is a General License
GTDR, without written assurance. Id. See generally id. § 779.4.
84 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
85 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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IV. Export Control of Data Encryption Software
Most exports are controlled by the Bureau of Export Administra-
tion (BXA).87 However, federal regulations identify several exports
that are governed by other government agencies."" For example, the
export of narcotics and dangerous drugs,8 9 commodities subject to the
Atomic Energy Act, 90 natural gas and electrical energy,91 and tobacco
seeds and plants92 are all controlled by other government agencies. Of
particular importance is the BXA's exclusion from control of items
listed on the United States Munitions List.93 The U.S. Department of
State regulates the export of items on the Munitions List.9
4
A. The United States Munitions List
The United States Munitions List 95 was established by section 38
of the Arms Export Control Act 96 to encourage "world peace and the
security and foreign policy of the United States."97 To accomplish this
goal, Congress authorized the President "to control the import and the
export of defense articles and defense services" 98 by compiling a list of
such items and regulating those items.99 The Munitions List contains
items such as bombs,10 0 grenades, 10 1 torpedoes, 10 2 ballistic missiles, 0 3
warships, 10 4 tanks, 10 5 military aircraft, 10 6 and spacecraft. 10 7 The Muni-
tions List also includes "cryptographic (including key management)
systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, compo-
nents or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confi-
dentiality of information or information systems."108 But, are
87 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(a), Supp. No. 1 (1993).
88 Id § 770.10(d)-(j).
89 Id4 § 770.10(d). The export of narcotics and dangerous drugs is regulated by the
Drug Enforcement Administration. Id.
90 Id. § 770.10(e). The export of commodities subject to the Atomic Energy Act is regu-
lated by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id
91 Id, § 7 7 0.10(g). The export of natural gas and electrical energy is regulated by the
United States Department of Energy. Id.
92 Id, § 770.10(h). The export of tobacco seeds and plants is regulated by the United
States Department of Agriculture. Id.
93 Id. § 770.10(a).
94 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1993).
95 Id. § 121.1.
96 Arms Export Control Act § 38, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988).
97 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1988).
98 Id.
99 Id
100 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category IV(a) (1993).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. § 121.1 Category IV(b).
104 Id. § 121.1 Category VI(a).
105 Id. § 121.1 Category VII(b).
106 Id. § 121.1 Category VIII(a).
107 Id. § 121.1 Category VIII(h)(1).
108 Id. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1). The Munitions List excludes some cryptographic
equipment and software such as software with decryption functions that "allow the execution
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cryptographic items "defense articles or services"? Is the spread of
cryptographic items a threat to world peace or to the security or for-
eign policy of the United States? The National Security Agency cer-
tainly thinks so.
B. The National Security Agency and Cryptography
The National Security Agency (NSA) 10 9 is part of the United
States Intelligence Community l° and was established as part of the
National Security Act of 1947.111 Harry Truman established the NSA
on October 24, 1952, by sending a memorandum to the Secretary of
State, Dean G. Acheson, and the Secretary of Defense, Robert A.
Lovett. 112 The Department of Defense is responsible for operating
and controlling the NSA.113 The primary responsibility of the NSA is
the "establishment and operation of an effective unified organization
for signals intelligence activities."' 1 4 This includes decoding the sig-
nals of foreign governments, collecting information for counterintel-
ligence purposes, and conducting research and development into
signals intelligence and communications security." 5 As part of its re-
sponsibilities, the NSA is actively involved in the regulation and control
of cryptography. 1 6 The State Department relies on the NSA's exper-
tise when deciding what cryptographic items to include on the Muni-
tions List. 117
During the Cold War, the NSA tightly controlled cryptographic
technology to prevent weakening "military security by providing new
encryption capabilities to our adversaries."" 8s However, to the disap-
pointment of many in the software industry, the NSA still refuses to
relax controls on cryptographic technology."19 Because encryption
of copy protected software," id § 121.1 Category XIII(b) (1) (i), software designed "for use in
machines for banking or money transactions," id. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1)(ii), and
software used only for the purposes of data authentication, id. § 121.1 Category
XlII(b) (1) (v).
109 Some say that NSA stands for "No Such Agency." Barlow, supra note 6, at 25. For a
detailed discussion of the NSA, see JAMES BAmFO D, THE PUZZLE PALACE (1982).
110 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,942 (1981). The goal of the Intelli-
gence Community is to "provide the President and the National Security Council with the
necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development
of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national inter-
ests from foreign security threats." Id.
111 National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 401-432 (1988)).
112 Barlow, supra note 6, at 25. The memorandum was kept secret for over 30 years. Id.
113 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed Reg. 59,941, 59,947 (1981).
114 Id. "Signals intelligence" includes all types of communications activities.
115 Id. at 59,948.
116 Graeme Browning, Software Hardball, 24 NAT'LJ. 2062, 2063 (1992).
117 Id.
118 Clark Weissman, A National Debate on Encryption Exportability, COMM. ACM, Oct. 1991,
at 162, 162.
119 Browning, supra note 116, at 2062-63.
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software appears on the Munitions List,120 an exporter seeking to sell
software containing an encryption algorithm abroad will have to apply
for an export license through the procedures set up by the State
Department. 121
C. Requesting a Commodity Jurisdiction Determination
The first step an exporter of encryption software is likely to take is
to have a determination made as to whether his encryption software
falls under the jurisdiction of the State Department or the Commerce
Department.1 22 In 1992, an expedited review process was established
to transfer jurisdiction of mass-market software with encryption from
the State Department to the Commerce Department. 123 Mass-market
software designed for installation by the user without further assistance
by the supplier is entitled to a fifteen-day review period.124 Addition-
ally, if the software uses the RC4 or the RC2 algorithms 125 and the key
is forty bits or less, the exporter is entitled to a seven-day review of his
product.126
During the review process, the jurisdiction request is assigned to
several government agencies for review.127 One of these agencies is
the NSA. 128 It is believed in the software community that unless the
NSA is able to break the encryption algorithm fairly easily, it will not
approve a license for international sale of the software.' 29 However,
the review process used by the NSA in evaluating encryption software is
classified and not available to the public. 130 If it is determined that the
Commerce Department has jurisdiction, an exporter will most likely be
able to obtain a general license for the export of his product. 31 How-
ever, if it is determined that the State Department has jurisdiction, the
exporter will have to apply for the extremely restrictive munitions
license. 132
120 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1) (1993).
121 Id. § 120.1(b).
122 See id. § 120.5.
123 Id. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1) note; OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PROCEDURE FOR SUBMrrTING A COMMODITYJURISDICTION REQUEST FOR A MASS
MARKET SoFrWARE PRODUCT THAT CONTAINS ENCRYPTION 1 (1993).
124 OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
ELIGIBILITY OF A MASS MARKET SoFrwARE PRODUCT FOR EXPEDITED HANDLING 1 (1993).
125 The RC2 and RC4 algorithms are the property of RSA Data Security. Id.
126 Id.
127 OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING
COMMODITYJURISDIC'ON (CJ) REQUESTS 1 (1993).
128 Gigi Bisson, Global Software Expansion Is Hampered by Strict U.S. Laws, MACWEEK, June
14, 1993, at 39, 42.
129 Barlow, supra note 6, at 26.
130 Telephone Interview with Ed Roback, Computer Specialist, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (Mar. 29, 1994).
131 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
132 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.1 to 125.10 (1993).
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D. Penalties for Breaking the Export Control Laws
Breaking the export control laws can be very costly. A violation of
the export restrictions on encryption software can result in a maxi-
mum criminal penalty of $1 million and ten years in prison133 or a
maximum civil penalty of $500,000 and a three-year export ban.13 4
Due to these restrictions, many in the software industry are calling for
change in the export regulations.
V. The Endeavor to Remove Export Controls on Encryption
Software
The U.S. software industry is a major player in the export of high-
technology products.' 3 5 In fact, "U.S.-made software accounts for 75
percent of all programs in the world."1 36 The software industry is one
of the fastest growing industries in the United States 3 7 and has be-
come one area where the United States is the clear leader in world
markets.' 38 In 1991, U.S. software companies sold $39.4 billion of
prepackaged software with revenues estimated to be between $18-27
billion.' 3 9 The industry is expected to grow even more with the huge
demand for new entertainment-related technology.' 40 Exports ac-
count for one-third to one-half of the annual earnings of many U.S.
software companies.' 4 ' As the demand for software increases, there is a
greater need for computer security, which is why many in the U.S.
software industry oppose restrictions on the export of encryption
software. ' 42
A. The Need for Encryption Software
With problems such as computerized theft, industrial espionage,
electronic vandalism, and forgery looming in the future, there is a real
133 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1988).
134 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (1988); Steve Higgins, Breaking U.S. Enctyption Statute Could
Be Costly, PC WK., Feb. 8, 1993, at 1, 16. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is an encryption program
available on bulletin board services in the United States which is based on the RSA algo-
rithms. Securing E-Mail, ByrE, May 1993, at 122, 122. Two software publishers of PGP,
ViaCrypt of Phoenix, Arizona, and Austin Code Works of Austin, Texas, are being investi-
gated by a grand jury to determine how PGP spread outside the United States. John Carey &
Stephen H. Wildstrom, Spy vs. Computer Nerd: The Fight Over Data Security, Bus. WK., Oct. 4,
1993, at 43, 43; Grand Juiy Investigates Software Program Exports, OL.ANDo SENTINEL, Sept. 22,
1993, at C5.
135 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063.
136 Higgins, supra note 134, at 16.
137 Hearings, Ozzie, supra note 35, at 4. The software industry has grown by "269% in real
terms versus about 30% for the economy as a whole." I&
138 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063.
139 Hearings, Ozzie, supra note 35, at 25.
140 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063. New compact disc-interactive (CDI) systems hook
up to a home television and blend TV broadcasts, electronic games, compact discs, and com-
puter graphics which allow the user to interact with the program. Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 2062-63.
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need for computer security. 143 As a result, encryption has become "a
routine business precaution. 1 44 Customers are demanding more and
more security for their computer systems as the price of those systems
decreases and the power of the systems increases. 145 In a recent survey
of U.S. Fortune 500 companies commissioned by the Business Software
Alliance, 92.1% of the respondents felt that "information security was
very important for their company," 14 6 and 46.4% "believed that data
encryption was important to protect the security and confidentiality of
information in addition to passwords and access control.1 47
A software developer may include* encryption techniques in any
program sold in the United States without restrictions. 148 Conse-
quently, more and more software developers are using encryption as
an indispensable part of many programs. 149 Popular programs such as
WordPeifect 6.0150 and even a new children's program, Creative Writer,'5'
utilize encryption routines. While the most effective encryption stan-
dards, the DES and RSA, may be used in any software sold in the
United States, these same encryption standards cannot be used in
software exported to other countries.' 5 2
B. Regulation of Encryption Software in Other Countries
Unlike the United States, most countries do not regulate encryp-
tion software. 153 This is why U.S. software developers are afraid that
143 Weekend Edition (National Public Radio broadcastJan. 3, 1993) (transcript available in
LEXIS, News Library, NPR File) (hereinafter Weekend].
144 Eric Hirschhorn & David Peyton, Uncle Sam's Secret Decoder Ring, WAsH. POST, June 25,
1992, at A23. Encryption gives anybody the ability to keep a thought expressed on his com-
puter as private as a thought in his head. Weekend, supra note 143.
145 Bisson, supra note 128, at 39, 42.
146 Frost & Sullivan, Inc., The Demand for Information Security and Encryption in Fortune 500
Companies in the United States 3 (Oct. 1, 1993) (on file with author).
147 Id. at 4.
148 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063.
149 Alyson Preston, Encryption Technology Is on the Rise in the Private Sector, PC WK.,June 28,
1993, at 207, 211.
150 DOS Dilemma: Word or WordPerfect ?, Byra, Oct. 1993, at 145, 146. While WordPerfect 6. 0
has encryption capabilities, the encryption algorithms are weak enough to allow it to be ex-
ported. See Facsimile from Ryan Richards, Associate General Counsel, WordPerfect Corpora-
tion, to Charles L. Evans, Business Manager, North CarolinaJournal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation (Mar. 28, 1994) (on file with author). However, WordPerfect Corpora-
tion would use a stronger algorithm if the export regulations would permit it. Facsimile from
Ryan Richards, Associate General Counsel, WordPerfect Corporation, to Charles L. Evans,
Business Manager, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (Mar.
29, 1994) (on file with author).
151 Htijx ktw Pnix, N.Y. TiMEs (Magazine), Jan. 23, 1994, § 6, at 12. The author of this
article intentionally encrypted the tide of the article by replacing each letter in the text with
another letter a few places down the alphabet. The title is translated: Codes for Kids. The
program teaches a child how to encrypt what they write. Id.
152 Mitch Ratcliffe & Mitzi Waltz, Encryption Raises Special Hurdles, MACWEEK, Nov. 2,
1992, at 20, 20.
153 In 1991, COCOM, see supra note 59 and accompanying text, recommended the re-
moval of export controls on mass-market encryption software. Richards, supra note 7, at BI 1.
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they will lose their share of foreign markets to overseas competitors. 154
For example, the new constitution in Russia "forbids governmental re-
strictions on the use of cryptography." 55 European countries allow
fairly routine export of encryption software, 156 especially Germany,
France, and Switzerland. 157 However, in France, the private use of
cryptography is illegal.158 So if anyone in France wants to use an en-
cryption program, the government must be provided with the key. 159
Encryption software for military activities is restricted in the United
Kingdom, but encryption software for use in banking does not face any
export restrictions. 160 The British, however, freely permit the export
of mass-market encryption software.' 6 ' Fear of foreign competition
has caused many U.S. software companies to start taking an active role
in what happens in Washington, D.C. 162
C. The Executive Branch's Struggle to Control Encryption Software
On July 17, 1992, after much pressure from the U.S. software in-
dustry and faced with the possibility of Congressional action, the Bush
Administration finally eased export controls on some encryption
software by modifying the NSA's review procedures and transferring
export controls on some encryption software to the Commerce Depart-
ment.163 Some industry officials viewed this change as an important
step in the right direction but cautioned that many restrictions still
remain. 164
On September 29, 1993, the Clinton Administration announced a
new National Export Strategy,165 which excited many people in the
154 Julie Bort & Martin Cheek, The Eagle Is Grounded: U.S. Software Firms Desperate to Export
Encrypted Software Are Being Cramped by the National Security Administration, COMPUTER WKLY.,
Feb. 11, 1993, at 32, 32; Hirschhorn & Peyton, supra note 144, at A23. For example, a $100
million Swiss contract for a financial computer system went to a European company because
the NSA prohibited the American companies from exporting a truly secure network. Barlow,
supra note 6, at 27.
155 John P. Barlow, A Plain Text on Crypto Policy, COMM. ACM, Nov. 1993, at 21, 24.
156 Information, supra note 64, at 1; Richards, supra note 7, at BI 1. In the future, however,
software exporters in Europe may face problems if the European Union (EU) decides to
restrict cryptographic products when the EU enacts uniform export legislation. Bort &
Cheek, supra note 154, at 32.
157 Bort & Cheek, supra note 154, at 32.
158 Barlow, supra note 155, at 24.
159 Ratcliffe & Waltz, supra note 152, at 20. The French intelligence community is re-
ported to have used these encryption keys to steal high-tech secrets from foreign companies
and then to have given these secrets to French computer makers. Id.
160 Bort & Cheek, supra note 154, at 32.
161 Hirschhorn & Peyton, supra note 144, at A23.
162 Browning, supra note 116, at 2062. Many software companies now have positions for
government affairs representatives and are joining lobbying groups such as the Business
Software Alliance and the Software Publishers Association. Id.
163 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063-64; Scowcroft Hears Industry Encryption Concerns, Ex-
PORT CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 29, 1992. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
164 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063-64.
165 See Remarks Announcing a National Export Strategy and an Exchange with Report-
ers, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRmS. Doc. 1918, 1918 (Sept. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Remarks].
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computer industry. 16 6 President Clinton promised to make "sweeping
changes in our export controls that [would] dramatically reduce con-
trols on telecommunications technologies and computers."1 67 He
stated that "the export controls in American law today no longer re-
flect the realities of the economic marketplace or the political reali-
ties." 168 However, the National Export Strategy did not make any
changes to export controls on mass-market encryption software.' 6 9 In
fact, the U.S. government's actions are now threatening sales of domes-
tic encryption software.
The increased use of computer security techniques threatens not
only the thieves and saboteurs for which it was designed, but also the
surveillance capabilities of law enforcement agencies and intelligence
organizations in the United States.170 Law enforcement agencies are
fighting for legislation that would require encryption software develop-
ers to provide a way, i.e., a "backdoor," for these agencies to descram-
ble the information.'71 Developers of encryption software argue that
giving the government a backdoor would weaken the security provided
by the software and that the government cannot be trusted with a set of
master keys to all encryption software. 172 Others argue that giving the
government a key to all encrypted information would violate a per-
son's constitutional right to privacy.' 73
1. The Clipper Chip
The NSA "is prohibited by the Computer Security Act of 1987174
from taking anything beyond an advisory role in domestit cryptogra-
phy issues;"' 75 however, this did not stop the NSA in the development
of the "Clipper Chip."176 The Clipper Chip is a "semiconductor device
that the NSA developed and wants installed in every telephone, com-
puter modem and fax machine." 177 The signals from devices with a
166 Unshackled Tech Looser Export Rules Will Boost Silicon Valley Sales, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Oct. 7, 1993, at 6B [hereinafter Unshackled].
167 Remarks, supra note 165, at 1919.
168 Id.
169 U.S. Software Firms Urge Liberalization of Controls on Encryption-Capable Items, 1993 Mgmt.
Briefing (BNA) (Oct. 7, 1993).
170 Weekend, supra note 143. The spread of encryption software is dreaded by many
United States law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, because
it hampers their ability to wiretap telephone conversations. Quittner, supra note 49, at 4.
171 Quittner, supra note 49, at 4.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 & 40 U.S.C.).
175 Weekend, supra note 143.
176 The Clipper Chip's encryption algorithm is called "Skipjack." Barlow, supra note 155,
at 21.
177 Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Who Should Keep the Keys?, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 90, 90. See
John P. Barlow, Jackboots on the Infobahn, WIRED, Apr. 1994, at 40.
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Clipper Chip are encrypted as they are sent.178 A device receiving the
signal would have to have its own Clipper Chip to decrypt the received
signal. 179 The Clipper Chip was unveiled by the Clinton Administra-
tion in April of 1993,180 and it utilizes a secret encryption algorithm a1 '
with an eighty-bit key length.'8 2 As the chips are manufactured, the
key is separated into two parts.183 The parts of the key are then held in
escrow by two different government agencies. 184 By obtaining the two
parts of the key, a law-enforcement agency can "legally listen in on the
owner of the communications device in which the chip has been
placed.' 8 5 However, many do not believe that the government will
only use the key for legal purposes. 18 6
If the government were to require a Clipper Chip in all computers
purchased by the government, the sheer volume of business the gov-
ernment does could force many encryption developers into using the
chip.'8 7 The Clinton Administration has even gone so far as to an-
nounce a new licensing procedure to allow export of the Clipper Chip
to other countries.' 88 It is doubtful, however, that any foreign compa-
nies would use the chip because they would not want the U.S. govern-
ment to have access to their computer systems. 189 Promotion of the
Clipper Chip' 90 could cripple the development of encryption software
178 Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 177, at 91.
179 Id For example, if a letter is faxed on a machine with a Clipper Chip, the letter can
only be received by another fax machine which has its own Clipper Chip to descramble the
fax transmission. Id.
180 Barlow, supra note 155, at 21.
181 Only the NSA knows the algorithm used in the Clipper Chip. Elmer-DeWitt, supra
note 177, at 90.
182 Id.
183 Barlow, supra note 155, at 21.
184 The Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology and
the Automated Systems Division of the Treasury Department have been designated to hold
the two parts of each key. U.S. Sets RulesforEavesdropping Technology, L.A. TiMas, Feb. 5, 1994,
at A21. See also Barlow, supra note 155, at 21.
185 Barlow, supra note 155, at 21. The Chinese recently announced new rules on com-
puter security that has a striking similarity to the Clipper Chip. China Rules on Computer &ecur-
ity in High-Tech Era, The Reuter European Business Report, Feb. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File. The new rules in China require that all computer networks "submit
to police inspection and any systems linked to international information networks must regis-
ter with state security departments." Id. One reason the Chinese government gave for the
new rules is that "anti-government dissidents were spreading viruses as weapons." Id.
186 Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 177, at 90-91. Other reasons given for opposition to the
Clipper Chip are: "criminals wouldn't use phones equipped with the government's chip;
foreign customers wouldn't buy communications gear for which the U.S. held the keys; the
system for giving investigators access to the back-door master codes was open to abuse; there
was no guarantee that some clever hacker wouldn't steal the keys." Id
187 Kurt Kleiner, Cracking into the World of Whispers, NEW SCIENTST, Sept. 18, 1993, at 14,
14.
188 U.S. Sets New Licensing Procedures for Encryption-Capable Exports, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 212, 212-13 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Licensing].
189 Kleiner, supra note 187, at 15.
190 See Lance J. Hoffman, Clipping Clipper, COMM. ACM, Sept. 1993, at 15, 15.
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in the United States' 91 because there would be no need for encryption
software if everyone were using the chip. 19 2 Additionally, if export
controls remain in effect, the software industry could lose its share of
the foreign markets as well.
D. Legislative Efforts to Remove Export Controls
Because the Executive Branch refuses to remove export controls
on mass-market encryption software, the software industry has turned
to Congress for relief.193 As far back as 1991, Representative Mel Le-
vine, D-California, attempted to transfer export jurisdiction over en-
cryption software to the Department of Commerce by amending the
Export Administration Act.194 Representative Levine's legislation was
passed by the House Foreign Affairs Trade Subcommittee, 195 but Presi-
dent Bush, as he had threatened, 19 6 vetoed the entire export legisla-
tion.t 97 President Bush, along with the NSA, believed that relaxing the
export controls on encryption software would threaten the security of
the United States.' 98 In 1993, another attempt was initiated to relax
export control of mass-market encryption software, and the software
community is requesting that this proposal become the law.' 99 The
bill was introduced by Representative Maria Cantwell, D-Washington,
on November 22, 1993.200
The Cantwell bill would place control of mass-market software
under the control of the Secretary of Commerce, and thus, under the
CCL system used for most software.2 0' The Secretary would have ex-
191 Industry Criticizes 'Clipper Chip, Calls for Review of Other Systems, 1993 Daily Rep. Exec.
(BNA) 106 (June 4, 1993).
192 Id&
193 Licensing, supra note 188, at 213.
194 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063-64.
195 House Foreign Affairs Panel Approves Bill to Reauthorize Export Administration Act, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1430, 1430 (Oct. 2, 1991); David Silverberg, Panel Exempts Commercial
Coded Software as Defense Export, DEF. NEws, Oct. 7, 1991, at 17, 17.
196 Hirschhorn & Peyton, supra note 144, at A23.
197 Unshackled, supra note 166, at B6.
198 Trade Negotiators Turn Eastward, I1 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 102, 116 (Jan. 19, 1994)
[hereinafter Trade]. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
199 Rep. Cantwell Introduces Legislation to Liberalize Controls on Software, 1993 Daily Rep.
Exec. (BNA) 225 (Nov. 24, 1993).
200 H.R. 3627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill has been referred to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. 139 CONG. Rac. H10,984 (1993). Companion legislation was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Patty Murray, D-Washington, on February 10, 1994. S.
1846, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
201 Representative Cantwell's bill would amend 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416 by adding the fol-
lowing new subsection:
(g) COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Secretary
shall have exclusive authority to control exports of all computer hardware,
software, and technology for information security (including encryption), ex-
cept that which is specifically designed or modified for military use, including
command, control, and intelligence applications.
(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES.-No validated license may be
required except pursuant to the trading with the Enemy Act or the Interna-
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clusive control over computer programs and products with the excep-
tion of those programs designed for military use. 20 2 The bill would
prohibit requiring a validated license to export mass-market
software.203 However, the bill would allow the Secretary of Commerce
to control exports to terrorist countries and to embargo countries.20 4
The bill would allow software companies to export mass-market en-
cryption software freely to almost any country in the world.
E. The NSA's Opposition to Removing Export Controls
The ability of the U.S. government to obtain information on its
adversaries has been considered vital to U.S. security for many years.205
Before the invention of telephones and radios, the government would
intercept the mail carried by spies to learn about threatening coun-
tries.206 With the invention of electronic communications, the govern-
ment has been able to retrieve relevant communications easily.207
However, the increased use of encryption has caused the United States
to turn to cryptographers to decode encrypted signals. 208 As the com-
plexity of encryption algorithms increases, the ability of the United
States to listen to the communications of other governments will
decrease.209
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only to the extent that the author-
ity of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act), for
the export or reexport of
(A) Any software, including software with encryption capabilities, that is
(i) Generally available, as is, and is designed for installation by the
purchaser; or
(ii) In the public domain or publicly available because it is gener-
ally accessible to the interested public in any form; or
(B) Any computing device solely because it incorporates or employs in
any form software (including software with encryption capabilities) ex-
empted from any requirement for avalidated license under subparagraph (A).
(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES.-The Secretary
shall authorize the export or reexport of software with encryption capabilities
for nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which exports of software of similar
capability are permitted for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact
by United States persons, unless there is substantial evidence that such software
will be
(A) Diverted to a military end-use or an end-use supporting interna-
tional terrorism;
(B) Modified for military or terrorist end-use; or
(C) Reexport without requisite United States authorization ....
H.R. 3627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
202 139 CONG. REc. E3,110 (1993).
203 J&d
204 1d&
205 The Impact on America's Software Industry of Current U.S. Government Munitions Export
Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings, Walker] (testi-
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In an effort to restrict the spread of cryptographic technology, the
NSA is strongly opposed to Representative Cantwell's bill.2 10 The NSA
believes that the removal of export controls on mass-market encryption
software would be a threat to the national security of the United
States.21' They assert that the spread of encryption software would
"help spies, terrorists21 2 and other 'enemies' of America keep commu-
nications secret from NSA's electronic eavesdroppers"213 and that en-
cryption software also interferes with NSA's capability to monitor other
international communications. 21 4 The NSA, however, will not explain
its objections in public. 215 It will only explain its opposition to the
Cantwell bill in classified briefings where the people who are briefed
cannot talk about the issue afterwards. 21 6
While the NSA will not explain its objections to data encryption
software, some in the software industry have attempted to ascertain the
national security threats posed by such software. 217 It is first necessary
to define "national security." National security is "protecting the coun-
try against both its foreign and domestic enemies."218 There are sev-
eral ways the United States attempts to protect its security: the
establishment and support of a military force; the gathering of intelli-
gence on enemies and friends; taking security measures to prevent
others from gaining intelligence on the United States; and enforcing
laws designed to protect the nation's security, such as laws against espi-
onage and terrorism. 219 With the end of the Cold War, the rise of
"Low Intensity Warfare"220 has made communications intelligence a
security measure of strategic importance.221
There are several methods of gathering intelligence through the
use of communications. Of particular importance is the ability to ana-
lyze a communicati6ns system and separate the information the NSA
210 Trade, supra note 198, at 114.
211 Robert T. Nelson, Software Firms, NSA Battle over Exports, SE.ArrLE TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1994,
at DI. The NSA is even opposed to public meetings on export regulations for fear of expos-
ing the secrets surrounding encryption algorithms and thus threatening the national security
of the United States. Kevin Power & Vanessa J. Grimm, Board Hopes Review Will Douse DSS
Flames, Gov'T COMPUTER NEws, July 20, 1992, at 10, 10.
212 Terrorism accounted for the death of two Americans in 1992 and six in 1993. Bar-
low, supra note 155, at 21, 23.
213 Browning, supra note 116, at 2063.
214 Hirschhorn & Peyton, supra note 144, at A23; Ratcliffe & Waltz, supra note 152, at 20.
215 Nelson, supra note 211, at DI.
216 Id.
217 Dr. Whit Diffie, Address at the RSA Data Security Conference (Jan. 12-14, 1994).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Low Intensity Warfare includes "revolution, border conflicts, terrorism, smuggling,
and espionage." Difile, supra note 217.
221 Id. Communications intelligence includes: search interception and selection, traffic
analysis, signal processing, cryptanalysis, retention, collateral intelligence, integration, evalua-
tion, sanitization, and dissemination. Id.
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needs from the information the NSA does not need.222 It is also im-
portant to prevent the dissemination of information that reveals the
methods used to conduct communications intelligence. 223 The in-
creased use of encryption worldwide enhances an enemy's ability to
develop offensive weapons to attack the American communications sys-
tem. 2 24 The NSA has sought to protect the American communications
system by carrying out a federal policy that seeks to protect both the
communications signals and the communications infrastructure in the
United States while at the same time minimizing the impact on domes-
tic intelligence and the security of communications systems in gen-
eral.22 5 One of the most effective ways of carrying out this policy is the
use of export controls on encryption software. 226
The imposition of export controls on encryption software is
designed to have several effects on the spread and use of cryptographic
technology.227 First, export controls tend to limit the availability of
encryption software of strategic capabilities. Export controls also limit
the availability of encryption software that hinders the NSA's ability to
find the information they need.228 Export controls tend to slow the
use of encryption software. And finally, export controls provide the
NSA with the ability to assess the current "quality, availability, and func-
tioning of commercially" available software. 229 While these objectives
are legitimate, the U.S. software industry disregards these arguments
and contends that encryption software is not a threat to U.S. security.
F. The Software Industry's Arguments for Removing Export Controls
In the past, "national security" was solely defined in military
terms.230 However, with the end of the Cold War, economic, techno-
logical, and environmental security have become very important fac-
tors in the security of the United States. 231 With the rise in global
competitiveness, the United States must act to protect the "most criti-
cal strategic industries."232 The U.S. Commerce Department has re-
ported that "new technologies are the strongest assurance for
222 Id. It becomes much more difficult to find the desired information as more and








230 Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elliott-Gower, US Export Controls in Transition: Implications of
the New Security Environment, TECH. MANRETS AND ExPoRT CoNTROLs IN THE 1990s 105, 111
(1991).
231 Id. at 111-13. In a 1990 poll of U.S. citizens, 90% of the respondents chose nonmili-
tary threats as the top two threats to national security. Id
232 Id. at 111-12.
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maintaining a superior national security posture." 23" Today's world re-
quires a "comprehensive and integrated conception of security."234
The lack of controls on encryption software in foreign countries
has resulted in the proliferation of encryption software worldwide. 235
The Software Publishers Association (SPA) 23 6 has identified "215 for-
eign hardware, software and combination products that encrypt text,
file and data,"23 7 and of these 215 products, 84 use the DES al-
gorithm.238 Encryption software is being manufactured in 20 foreign
countries.23 9 As a comparison, there are 283 encryption products in
the United States, and 148 use the DES. 240
Several CEOs of America's top software companies believe that
the "demand for information security is increasing so rapidly and be-
coming so widespread that American (software) companies stand to
lose billions in annual revenue and tens of thousands ofjobs" if export
controls remain on mass-market encryption software.2 41 Software rep-
resentatives have stated that the Clinton Administration is "permitting
a situation to persist that is directly threatening the continued viability
and success of the American software industry."242 Computer custom-
ers are demanding that they be able to protect their information, 243
and the software industry fears that they are "going to be closed out of
the foreign market, and [they] may lose sales of noncontrolled software
and maybe even hardware and services because [they] can't provide the
total package the customer wants." 244
As a result of U.S. export controls, software developers have to
"dumb down"245 the encryption software they sell in foreign coun-
tries.2 46 In addition, many software developers cannot afford to have a
domestic version of their software for use in the United States and an
international version to export to other countries; therefore, a "weaker
233 1& at 112.
234 Id. at 113.
235 See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
236 The SPA represents "more than 900 publishers in the business, consumer, and educa-
tion software markets." U.S. Sets Procedures for Easing Controls on Exports of Encoding-Capable
Software, 1992 Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) 140, 140 (July 21, 1992).
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overseas. Id.
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version" is used in the United States and in foreign countries. 247 Thus,
the dumbing down of software "short changes consumers at home and
forces U.S. companies to squander their technological lead abroad."248
The SPA has argued that "strictly controlling exports of software with
encryption capabilities does not protect national security interests be-
cause such programs become available abroad as soon as they are
made available in the United States, through the illegal export of
floppy disks or the transfer of programs to foreign countries via tele-
phone modem."249
The fight for export freedom of mass-market encryption software
is in its initial stages. With foreign competitors just waiting for an op-
portunity to increase their share of the software market, it is a battle
that the U.S. software industry cannot afford to lose. The bill intro-
duced in Congress by Representative Cantwell is the first step, and it
has already met with resistance from the NSA. The NSA has been
guarding cryptographic technology for many years, and it does not ap-
pear that it is willing to give up control without a fight.
VI. Conclusion
The NSA may believe that encryption software is a threat to the
national security of the United States, but the fact that other industrial-
ized countries do not restrict its flow should serve as an example to the
NSA that encryption software does not threaten a nation's security
enough to warrant the imposition of export controls. The slight threat
which encryption software might pose is not worth jeopardizing the
future of the entire software industry to reduce this threat.
While U.S. software exporters are busy fighting the NSA, foreign
companies are busy biting into the software market that the United
States has dominated for many years. Neither foreign nor U.S. corpo-
rations can afford to use weak encryption software. The NSA's actions
are causing U.S. corporations to sacrifice their security for the security
of the United States. Due to the wide availability of encryption in for-
eign countries, any threat caused by encryption software will not be
diminished by imposing export controls on U.S. software companies.
Export controls will only cause the U.S. software industry to lose its
ability to compete in foreign markets. The NSA must realize before it's
too late that the use of mass-market encryption software does not pose
enough of a threat to the security of the United States to justify the
imposition of export restrictions on data encryption software.
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